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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to examine whether changes in the capital controls affect the 
premium of the cross-listed stock of Össur hf., it is listed on the Icelandic and Copenhagen 
stock exchange. The price difference is examined with two currency rates, the official rate 
as given by the Central bank of Iceland and the offshore rate. The Icelandic market is 
bounded within capital controls, while the market in Denmark is not. From the 
introduction of the capital controls in 2008, they have been a subject of continuous 
change, and this study examines the effects of these changes on the premium between 
the Icelandic and Danish Össur stocks. The study uses a market model, adjusted for time-
varying volatility, which contributes more concrete results. The results from the study 
indicate strongly, that the price differential is affected by the changes in the capital 
controls. Moreover, how the change is implemented is a key factor in the overall 
significance of the change. 
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1  Introduction 
After the financial crisis in 2008 and its aftermath, only four Icelandic companies 
remained on the Nasdaq OMX Iceland, down from 26 firms the year before. In the past 
few years the Icelandic stock market has started growing again and currently there are 
13 firms registered on the Nasdaq OMX Iceland with many new listing in the last three 
years. One of the companies that survived the turmoil of the financial crisis was Össur hf., 
an Icelandic prosthetic manufacturer. Össur hf., was initially listed on Nasdaq OMX 
Iceland in 1999, and in 2009 it became the only cross-listed Icelandic firm when it was 
registered on the on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (Össur, 1999 & 2009).  
According to traditional investment theory all uncertainty is priced into stocks and 
arbitrage opportunities should not arise. The argument is intuitive, if such an opportunity 
appears, market participants will use it to their advantages, until the gap is eliminated 
and arbitrage is no longer available. When the same asset differs in price in two different 
markets there should always be a rational explanation, more specifically, difference in 
risk level between the two markets (e.g. Santis and Gérard, 1998; Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). 
During the 2008 financial crisis capital controls were established in Iceland to restrict 
outflows and inflows of capital and have remained with some alteration since then. 
Several studies have investigated the effects of capital controls on the economy (e.g. 
Satyanath and Berger, 2007), and others the effects on asset pricing (e.g. Forbes, 2007). 
In general, the results are less than impressive with lacklustre performance for countries 
with capital controls, and distorted stock markets within those countries. In Iceland, 
scholars and politicians have been keen on pointing out the importance of abolishing the 
capital controls, but to this day no such plan has been put forward (e.g. Daníelsson, 2015; 
Benediktsson, 2013). Therefore, it is apparent that capital controls will define the 
Icelandic economy for at least the next few years. 
Some studies have found that the price of the same asset can differ for long periods 
of time in segmented markets (e.g. Ma, 1996; Hietala, 1989). The basis of this, is that 
there are some features on the domestic or foreign market that drive a wedge between 
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the prices. This applies directly to the Icelandic situation, for Össur. Therefore, the 
Icelandic capital controls, even though they lead to great inefficiency, have created a 
unique opportunity for research, since the same asset, Össur hf., is listed on two markets, 
where one market is restricted by capital controls, and the other a free market, Denmark. 
In addition, the capital controls have been changed fourteen times since Össur was listed 
in Copenhagen, which presents an opportunity to examine whether those changes affect 
asset pricing.  
The empirical part of the thesis focuses on whether changes in the capital controls 
affect the price relationship between the two markets. The study will compare the stock 
prices of Össur on the Icelandic and Danish market. The difference in price will be 
estimated, with special focus on the effects on the deviation when the capital controls 
are modified. The difference in the stock price will be examined with two currency rates 
of the Icelandic Krona (ISK), the official currency rate as reported by the Central Bank of 
Iceland (CBI) and the offshore currency rate as published by Citibank.  
The method of choice in this research is an Event study. It is a traditional method in 
finance to estimate the effects of a single or multiple events. This method is widely 
recognized as an estimation method and has been used in a variety a papers regarding 
effect of events on economic variables (e.g. Brockett et al., 1999 and Wang et al., 2002). 
The study has the potential to have explanatory power on to what extent the capital 
controls affect the asset prices in Iceland. The results may help investors understand the 
effects of abolishing the capital controls, or what effect future changes will have on the 
stock price of Össur. When, or if, markets become free in Iceland, the expectation is that 
the stocks of Össur should be equally priced due to the no arbitrage principle. The 
purpose of this research is to estimate the effects of changes in the capital controls on 
the price premium between the Icelandic and Danish stocks of Össur. 
Do changes in the capital controls affect the premium between the Icelandic and 
Danish stock of Össur? 
The results of the study seem to indicate that changes in the capital controls have an 
effect on the stock prices, and the premium between the Icelandic and Danish stocks of 
Össur. However, the significance of the changes seems to depend heavily on how they 
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are implemented and how comprehensive the law changes are. Unanticipated changes 
seem in general to have greater effect on the premium and the stock price of Össur than 
anticipated changes. In comparison, US healthcare firms are examined, which are not, in 
general, effected significantly during the event windows. This suggests that the significant 
effects are not caused by variables affecting the whole healthcare industry. Furthermore, 
Icelandic firms were also tested in comparison, and a majority of firms report significant 
returns during the event period. This result indicates that the capital controls are a state 
variable, but they affect firms differently depending on their foreign exposure. 
Companies with great foreign exposure, such as Össur, seem to show the most significant 
returns when the controls are tightened. 
The Icelandic stock market, and subsequently Össur’s stock price, has received little 
attention in the literature. The biggest contribution of the thesis is both the study itself, 
on the effects of changes in the capital controls, and the data collected regarding the 
changes in the capital controls. The data is hand collected from several sources, 
governmental agencies responsible for the changes, then news from media outlets, and 
responses from financial analysts are examined to estimate both interest and expected 
effect of the change. Due to the special nature of the capital controls, all information is 
concentrated in Iceland while global news sites do no show the situation as much interest. 
Therefore, almost all information is only available in Icelandic, limiting potential 
researchers to the ones who are fluent in Icelandic, even though the topic and the 
situation is very unique. 
The thesis is divided into four sections. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on 
liquidity, currency risk and studies on premiums between the same assets on two 
markets. The situation in Iceland is also briefly introduced. In chapter 3 the methodology 
of the thesis is introduced and explained. In chapter 4 the empirical results are presented. 
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the thesis, where the results are drawn together and 
concluding remarks made.
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2 Literature review 
Several studies have looked at capital controls and its effect on the economy and asset 
pricing (e.g. Forbes, 2007, Li et al., 2004). One of the problems when studying capital 
controls is that conventional measures usually do not account perfectly for how intensive 
the controls are, making comparison across countries difficult (Chinn & Ito, 2008). In this 
chapter, the most important results from the literature are introduced. Studies on the 
linkage between uncertainty and price of assets are presented, with emphasis on 
currency risk and liquidity, which are a prominent problems in Iceland. Next, studies on 
the effects of capital controls on asset prices are presented. Finally, the situation in 
Iceland is briefly introduced. 
2.1 Liquidity 
In 1986, Amihud and Mendelson published a revolutionary paper, where they state that 
liquidity is an important factor in the CAPM. In the study, they used the bid-ask spread as 
a proxy for how liquid stock prices are. According to them, asset pricing is a function of 
liquidity, among other things, and assets with poor liquidity are in general lower priced 
than similar assets with better liquidity. 
One of the problems using liquidity as a factor, is the difficulty of measuring it, but 
much like risk there is not a coherent measure of liquidity. In a later paper by Amihud 
(2002), a new and simple measure for liquidity is suggested that can be calculated using 
readily available information from stock markets around the world: 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝒊𝒚 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑦 ∑ |𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑|
𝐷𝑖𝑦
𝑡=1
/𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑦𝑑 
The stock illiquidity is defined as the average ratio of daily absolute return to the 
trading volume of that day. VOLD is the daily volume in dollars, Riyd is the return on stock 
i on day d of year y and D is the number of days for which data is available for the stock. 
Since the paper from Amihud and Mendelson in 1986 was published, a variety of 
research has been conducted on the importance of liquidity with regards to stock returns. 
In their recognized paper from 2002, Pastor and Stambaugh found that market-wide 
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liquidity seems to be a state variable which is an important factor in pricing common 
stocks. Stocks that are more sensitive to liquidity will on average earn higher returns, 
indicating that investors want compensation to take on illiquid assets. Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad (2007) looked at the effect of liquidity on returns in emerging markets in 
Asia and Latin America. The results were as expected, illiquid stocks have higher returns 
than more liquid stock. The reasoning is, as predicted by CAPM, that investors have to be 
compensated for higher risk, resulting from illiquidity, with higher returns. 
In an interesting study conducted by Forbes (2007), she points out the curious effects 
of capital controls on prices. An important distinction is made between restriction on 
inflows and outflows. Reducing capital inflows, makes it difficult for foreign investors to 
invest in the economy, hence reducing valuable information and liquidity. However, 
restricting outflows can increase liquidity, due to the fact that domestic investors can no 
longer invest and raise capital on foreign markets. Under these circumstances, it is likely 
that assets on the market will be wrongly valuated. As Forbes points out, this is more 
common in lesser developed financial markets, where foreign investors could bring their 
expertise to value assets more correctly. Forbes’ research contribution relates to the 
overall effect of capital controls on the market and the disturbances created.  
These studies, however, do not look at cross-listing and the potential price differential 
that can arise due to variety of reasons. This thesis will take a much narrower look at the 
effects of capital controls, and the potential effects on prices of the same asset in two 
different markets. 
The illiquidity on the Icelandic market may affect the results from this study. The 
Icelandic market is young, small and is dominated by large investors, both institutional 
and private, that have had difficulties moving large positions both prior and after the 
onset of the capital controls. (Finnbogadóttir, 2011). The largest investors, primarily 
pension funds, hold approximately 43% of stocks in all publicly issued firms. The pension 
funds usually apply a buy-and-hold strategy, rarely responding to external events 
(Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson, 2014). The lack of efficiency, may introduce bias against 
finding significant results, when the capital controls are modified, due to the fact that the 
market is already very illiquid  
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2.2 Currency risk 
In a comprehensive study by De Santis and Gérard (1998), they describe in detail the 
importance of currency risk on asset pricing. Allowing for time varying currency risk, they 
find that currency risk is a priced factor in securities. For non-US markets in the study, the 
currency premium explains a large portion of the total risk premium, up and to 64% of 
the total risk. Due to the low dependence on foreign markets the US risk premium, 
however, is almost solely explained by market risk. 
Griffin and Stulz (2001) examine the effects of currency shocks on stock returns, on six 
large market. The study reaches a conclusion, contrary to the view of Santis and Gérard 
earlier research on the importance of the exchange rate. The effects of the exchange rate 
shocks on the performance of industries are little or insignificant, even in countries and 
industries highly dependent on international trade. They state that the most likely 
explanations is that firms use financial instruments and operations as a hedge to mitigate 
the effect of exchange rate shocks of firms. 
In a study by Antell and Vaihekoski (2007), they examine the Finnish market from 1970 
to 2004, and implement a GARCH-M framework to allow a time varying variance-
covariance process. The research examines the effect from a foreign investor perspective, 
particularly US investors. They find indications of the currency risk being significantly 
different from zero, and priced into the stock market. They also point at the dangers of 
using traditional market models when estimating small stock markets. 
These studies indicate that currency risk has a large effect on how assets are priced on 
the stock market. As Griffin and Stulz (2001) point out, effects of exchange rate risk can 
be mitigated by using financial instruments and hedging. However, the derivatives market 
in Iceland is very primitive, and thus many firms do not use, or have access to these kind 
of instruments. As a result, currency risk is even more important in the Icelandic market, 
especially to Össur which is one of few companies with most of their income and costs in 
Euros. If changes in capital controls affect the risk associated with the ISK it should 
increase the possibility of detecting significant returns in the stock price of Össur around 
the changes. 
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2.3 Capital controls and stock prices 
When studying the topic of price differential, between the same assets on two different 
markets, Ma (1996) found some interesting results. The subject was China, where capital 
controls were an important factor and somewhat resembled the situation in Iceland, 
were citizens in China were not allowed to hold and buy foreign currency freely. In the 
stock market, Chinese firms issued two types of shares, A and B. With A class only 
available for Chinese citizens and B class for foreigners and traded in foreign currency. 
The result of the study, contradicting many other studies, is that the B class stocks were 
sold at a discount. The study furthermore concludes, that based on this evidence, the 
price between the same stocks may differ between markets if the markets are 
segmented. The price differential may be caused by a variety of factors e.g. regulatory 
rules, risk aversion of investors and diversification value of stock in any given market. 
Another study on price differential comes from Finland (Hietala, 1989), where the 
situation on the stock market was also similar to the Icelandic market today. Before 1986, 
investors were not allowed to hold foreign securities without a special permission from 
the Bank of Finland. For most stocks, foreign holdings were limited to a maximum of 20% 
per company. These companies represented about 80% of the market, so there were 
essentially two types of stocks for any given company on the market, stocks restricted to 
Finnish investors only and stocks unrestricted for all investors to own. Hietala designed a 
model for the Finnish market, which entails that if foreign investors have lower rate of 
return than Finnish investors, the unrestricted stock will trade on a higher price than the 
restricted one. When the rate of return for foreign investor is higher than the Finnish 
investor, the price of the two stock should be identical, Finns will buy up the stocks and 
the foreigners will invest elsewhere. The empirical findings support this theory in Finland, 
where for some stock there is a significant premium on the unrestricted stock but never 
the other way around. 
Both these papers reach a conclusion that supports the potential of different pricing 
of the same assets if the markets in question are segmented. Both studies look for 
explanations of why there exists a price differential for the same assets. The present 
study, however, makes no such attempt. The reason for the potential difference in price 
is assumed to be caused by the capital controls. As well, this study looks at individually 
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influencing events that might cause changes in the premium or in some instances force a 
premium into existence.  
Lastly, in related work by Sigfússon and Björnsson (2014), the overall effect of capital 
controls on the stock market in Iceland is examined. It is a multiple based research, where 
Icelandic companies are compared to comparable foreign companies. The result indicate 
that six of the ten stocks on the market are influenced by the capital controls, overpriced 
compared to their foreign counterparts. However, there is no discussion about the cross-
listed Össur, and whether changes in the capital controls have had any effect. 
Nevertheless, the research is still noteworthy, as it suggests that the capital controls have 
price distorting effects on the stock market. The study also has some drawbacks, multiple 
based comparison is in itself flawed and comparing Icelandic companies to their larger 
foreign counterparts using only multiples can lead to a misevaluation (McKinsey, 2010). 
The intuition behind Icelandic stocks being overpriced is clear, Icelandic investors are 
restricted to invest domestically. In general, this leads to higher than optimal investment 
on the domestic market. This increased demand from Icelandic investors is believed to 
be greater than the foregone interest from foreign investors due to the capital controls 
(Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2014). 
2.4 Capital controls in Iceland 
The purpose of the capital controls, set in October 2008, was to reduce inflows and 
outflows of capital to and from the country, to stabilize the currency and the economy. 
This in effect eliminated the existing currency market and regular currency transactions 
in Iceland. In 2009, inflows of capital were permitted again, while the outflows were 
restricted even further. Despite recurring modifications, the foundation of the capital 
controls is still restrictions on outflows. Since the legal basis of the Icelandic capital 
controls is very comprehensive, the full chronology of the changes and history of the laws 
are left to the appendix. 
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Figure 1: Capital controls established (black line), capital controls tightened (dotted lines) 
As can be seen in figure 1, it is hard to deny that the goal of stopping the free fall was 
successful, at least in the very short run. But one of the criticism, has however, been on 
how often the CBI and government have had to step in and change the laws on the capital 
controls in order to strengthen the ISK. 
Historically, changes in the exchange rate have passed through the economy quickly, 
often leading to inflation spikes. Furthermore, a high correlation between the currency 
rate and inflation has been present in the Icelandic market. Both can be seen in figure 2. 
Moreover, over two thirds of corporate debt was in foreign currency at the time of the 
crisis, while most firms only had income in ISK (Baldursson and Portes, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: CPI and ISK/EUR 
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The exchange rate depletion, would have led to an extreme situation for households 
as well. Most of Icelandic households had indexed linked mortgages, which would have 
surged upwards, with increased inflation following the plummet in the domestic 
currency. A large portion of the private consumption, were foreign goods that would have 
increased substantially in price as well. A smaller part of households had their mortgages 
in foreign currency and their income in ISK, would have defaulted, had the currency been 
allowed to deplete (Schwartz, 2011). 
2.5 Offshore rate 
After the capital controls were established two markets for the ISK were created. The 
official CBI rate, the onshore rate, and the offshore rate of the ISK. Generally, an offshore 
rate refers to the exchange rate of a given currency outside of that country. In Iceland, 
the offshore rate applies to ISK owned by foreign individuals that got stuck in Iceland after 
the crisis, since they are restricted by the capital controls. These specific holders of 
offshore ISK, have very limited investment options with their ISK. In figure 3 the two 
exchange rates are plotted, where the starting point of the offshore rate is the 
implementation of the capital controls. 
 
Figure 3: Historical exchange rate 
The offshore rate has been considerably more volatile than the official currency rate, 
as the CBI cannot effect that rate as effectively as the official rate. Both these currency 
rates will be examined, and their implications on the effects of the study.  
50
100
150
200
250
300
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
ISK/EUR - CBI and offshore rate
ISK/EUR ISK/EUR offsh.
 18 
3 Methodology 
In this chapter the methodology of the event study will be introduced along with the 
standard methods used in an event study. Then, the method that is used in the study is 
introduced, the market model, and the adjustments that are made to the traditional 
model and its specific application for this study. Next, the data that is used in the study is 
presented, and finally, the expected response to various events is predicted. 
3.1 Event study 
One way to measure the effects of certain events on other variables in economics and 
finance is an event study. The event study requires an estimation period where normal 
returns are estimated and an event window where the effects of the event are examined. 
The difference between the expected normal returns and actual returns in the estimation 
period is generally called abnormal returns. For the past decade there has been a variety 
of research using event studies, most studies follow a standard procedure, designed by 
MacKinley in 1997 and others have supported (e.g. Konchitchki and O'Leary, 2011). This 
procedure will be followed in this study and is listed below: 
1. Event definition: The first task, is to define the event of interest, and how long 
the period, that the returns are estimated, should be, the event window. 
2. Selection criteria: The next task is to decide which securities should be included 
in the study. Usually, event studies aggregate security returns with respect to 
certain features (e.g. size or industry), in order to get the overall effect of the 
event. 
3. Measuring normal and abnormal returns: Normal returns are the expected 
returns if the event in question does not take place. Formally, it can be written as, 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝛺𝑖𝑡], where R is the return for firm i at time t and Ω is the conditioning 
information for the normal performance model. The observations are split into an 
estimation window of L1 return observations and event window of L2 return 
observations. Looking at it visually may facilitate understanding, and a time line 
of an event study can be seen in figure 4. 
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4. Measuring and testing abnormal returns: The abnormal returns can be defined 
by the residual. Given the normal returns the abnormal returns can be calculated 
with: 
𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝛺𝑖𝑡] 
The 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ , and 𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝛺𝑖𝑡] are the abnormal returns, actual and normal returns, 
respectively, where 𝛺𝑖𝑡 is conditioning information for normal performance. With 
this model we can implement the necessary tests to estimate whether or not the 
abnormal returns are statistically significant from the expected normal returns in 
the same period. 
3.2 Models of measurement in event studies 
The two most common ways of measuring normal and abnormal returns are the constant 
mean return model and the market model. The constant mean return model assumes that 
returns are constant: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0            𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
Expected normal return is defined as 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝛺𝑖𝑡
∗ ] = ?̂?𝑖 
?̂?𝑖 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0+1
 
The focus in this thesis, however, is on the market-model, as we assume a stable 
relation between the market and the security return. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0            𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
Expected normal return is defined as 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝛺𝑖𝑡
∗ ] = ?̂?𝑖 + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡
∗  
(𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤] (𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤] (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤] 
𝑇0 𝑇3 𝑇1 𝑇2 
Figure 4: Event study 
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3.2.1 Adjustments to the market model 
The market model is estimated with OLS, which relies on a constant variance. One of the 
problems with financial data is volatility clustering. In fact volatility of financial series 
display a positive autocorrelation over several days, where high volatility is clustered 
together in some periods and low volatility is clustered together in other periods. How 
persistent a series is depends on how many lags of a series are significant, the more lags 
the more persistent the series is. There is no correlation in returns themselves but it exists 
in the volatility of returns (Cont, 2001).The OLS will still be unbiased but both the variance 
and standard error will be computed using the wrong assumptions. 
To counter the volatility clustering, security returns are sometimes estimated with an 
ARCH or a GARCH model, depending on the nature of the heteroscedasticity present in 
the data. ARCH is the predecessor, originally developed by Engle (1982) which allows the 
volatility today to depend on the volatility of previous periods. Bollerslev (1986), then 
developed an extension of this model, a GARCH model.  
The most commonly used model is a GARCH(1,1), which will be implemented in this 
study. Various research have supported the use of GARCH(1,1) over other combinations 
(Engle et al., 1993; Hansen and Lund, 2005). After the adjustment there is no indication 
of heteroscedasticity or auto correlation. This method of integrating the GARCH(1,1) in 
to the event study has been used before and Wang et al. (2002) argued that this method 
is more efficient and reliable than traditional event studies. The reason being that GARCH 
is necessary to account for the time-varying volatility in the security returns. 
3.3 Application of the market model to Össur hf. 
In this study the focus will be on a single stock, Össur and all other calculation will be a 
supplement to that. The reason is that its cross-listing on the Icelandic and Danish market 
makes it unique, the Icelandic market, with capital controls, and the Danish market, not 
bounded by any restriction. However, during the sample time three companies based in 
the Faroe Island were also cross-listed on the Icelandic stock exchange and the 
Copenhagen stock exchange, but the stocks are very illiquid, and any empirical study on 
these stocks will have a very low validity. The turnover measured in monetary terms is 
extremely low, and historically these stocks have only been traded on about 4% - 15% of 
all trading days.  
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As suggested by Konchitchki and O'Leary (2011) the optimal estimation window varies 
somewhat, but is usually between 120-280 days depending on the study, which all events 
in this study fulfil. The estimation window will consist of one hundred observation (total 
of 200 observation), pre- and post- the event window. For increased robustness, there 
will be in total seven event windows estimated. 
 Event day (total: 1 day) 
 Event day +/- one day (total: 3 days) 
 Event day +/- two days (total: 5 days) 
 Event day +/- four days (total: 9 days) 
 Event day +/- ten days (total: 21 days) 
 Event day + four days, - one day (total: 6 days) 
 Event day + one day, - four days (total: 6 days) 
The length of the event window is quite arbitrary and varies between studies 
(Konchitchki and O'Leary, 2011). With only one stock of particular interest, it is more 
important to use a variety of event windows to be able to make concrete inferences from 
the results. With a small population and a small market as in Iceland, it is possible that 
the market has information about legal changes before they become public knowledge 
and react accordingly. By including different kind of event windows, how and when the 
market responds is more likely to be revealed. The expectations is that investors will 
adjust as soon as changes are recognized, rather than when the changes are actually 
implemented.  
In comparison, three comparable firms listed on the NYSE, are examined as well. The 
firms are Hanger, Inc., Tenet Healthcare and Universal Health Care. All these firms 
operate in the healthcare industry. Hanger is a prosthetic producer, Tenet is an owner of 
a healthcare service and Universal Health Care offers a broad healthcare service in the 
United States. The twelve main firms listed on the Icelandic stock exchange are also 
examined, in comparison, using the same time period and their abnormal returns during 
the event periods. Two of these firms are excluded, HB and Nyherji, since they are too 
illiquid to perform an empirical study on. They only display changes in price about 7-8% 
of trading days, during a five year period. The same event dates are examined, and 
whether these firms’ response differ from Össur’s at the event dates. 
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3.4 Data 
The most important contribution of this thesis is the gathering of information surrounding 
the events. The events, as previously mentioned, are changes in the capital controls. 
There is no official database that contains these changes, and the information is collected 
through various government agencies and media outlets. Most of the changes are made 
by the government as laws approved by the parliament. Information on these changes 
are gathered from Alþingi, the Icelandic parliament, specifically all changes made on the 
original bill from 1992 regarding rules on the currency. Total changes from the 
implementation of the capital controls are seventeen, eleven implemented by the 
parliament. 
The remaining six modifications were implemented by the CBI, which has gained more 
power in recent years to make changes. The information on these changes are collected 
from the official site of the CBI.  
Date of legislation Implementation Effect Expectation Interest Legislator 
31/10/2009 1/11/2009 Tightened Unanticipated High 
Stricter 
restrictions - CBI 
30/4/2010 30/4/2010 Tightened Unanticipated Small 
Stricter 
restrictions on 
individuals and 
offshore ISK -CBI 
14/6/2010 30/6/2010 Tightened Unanticipated High 
Higher fines – 
Parliament 
1/11/2010 1/11/2010 Loosened Unanticipated High 
Exception for 
Össur - CBI 
25/3/2011 25/3/2011 Loosened Anticipated High 
Plan to reduce 
offshore ISK - CBI 
11/6/2011 29/6/2011 Neutral Anticipated No 
Wording - 
Parliament 
17/9/2011 30/9/2011 Tightened Anticipated Small 
New rules  -
Parliament 
13/3/2012 13/3/2012 Tightened Unanticipated High 
Stricter rules - 
Parliament 
28/2/2012 16/3/2012 Neutral Anticipated No 
Wording - 
Parliament 
9/3/2013 9/3/2013 Loosened Unanticipated Small 
Higher fines, 
more exceptions 
– Parliament 
26/3/2013 5/4/2013 Loosened Anticipated Small 
Higher fines, 
more individual 
freedom - 
Parliament 
16/5/2014 5/6/2014 Tightened Anticipated Small 
Higher fines – 
Parliament 
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The normal way of aggregating all results is not an option in this study, and each event 
needs to be studied individually due to the diversity of the changes. Some of the changes 
were anticipated while others were not, some tighten the capital controls while others 
loosen them, and finally some receive great interest from the media and financial 
analysts. To determine the level of interest, press releases from government agencies, 
news from the main media outlets and responses from financial analysts are examined in 
detail. In table 1, the events are categorized into these classes. Many of the changes are 
very comprehensive so the detailed description is left to the appendix. 
Other data used in the study is from the data service DataStream. Given that the main 
focus is on the unique opportunity presented with the cross-listed stock of Össur, within 
and outside of capital controls, the starting date represents Össur’s IPO in Copenhagen. 
The data spans from 04/09/2009 to 30/03/2015. Three currency rates are also obtained: 
ISK/Offshore EUR, ISK/DKK and DKK/EUR. The only offshore rate available for Iceland is 
against the Euro, it is used later when converting prices of the stocks to the same 
currency. The reason for using the offshore rate, is that under the capital controls the 
official currency rate is not at its market equilibrium, as if the currency were allowed to 
float freely. Therefore comparing the stock prices using the offshore rate gives another 
view on how the stock prices have evolved. 
3.5 Expected effects of changes in capital controls on Össur 
The fact that Össur was not listed on the Danish market until after the crisis will make the 
analysis less robust, as there is no reference point before the crisis, with both markets 
unrestricted. 
Even though the capital controls probably rushed the process of the cross listing, the 
CEO of Össur, Jón Sigurðsson, stated that the goal of the listing was mainly to strengthen 
future growth, not to circumvent the capital controls: 
17/6/2014 19/6/2014 Tightened Unanticipated High 
Pension fund 
restrictions - CBI 
6/3/2015 6/32015 Tightened Unanticipated High 
Fewer options for 
offshore ISK -CBI 
Table 1: Events 
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The dual listing in Copenhagen is logical next step for us, aimed at 
strengthening the company´s financial foundation for future growth – Jón 
Sigurðsson (Nasdaq OMX Copenhagen welcomes Össur hf., 2009) 
As mentioned before, two currency rates will be used. The offshore rate and the CBI rate. 
The expectation of the effects of the changes in capital controls depend largely on the 
type of change. Using the CBI rate, tightening of the controls are expected to increase the 
premium between the two stocks. The reason is twofold, firstly it reduces the chance of 
domestic capital to circumvent the capital controls and investing it on foreign soil. 
Secondly, Össur is one of few companies on the Icelandic stock market not dependent on 
the domestic market, and investors might conclude that investing in Össur is one of few 
opportunities to diversify from domestic risk factors thereby raising its price. The 
expectation of loosening the capital controls is the reverse, the premium is expected to 
decrease if that opens possibilities for Icelandic investors to invest to a greater extend in 
foreign assets and decrease their domestic holdings. Both loosening and tightening and 
their effect also largely depend on how large and comprehensive the changes are. The 
expectation of neutral changes is no effect, the reason is that the neutral changes are 
changes that do not affect the actual purpose of the laws, only formal changes. 
Using the offshore rate, the expectation is that the changes should have less effects 
then the CBI rate. The offshore ISK should represent to a greater extent some kind of 
market rate for the ISK which the CBI does not affect. Significant changes in the capital 
controls should also affect the value of the offshore ISK depending on the change. The 
argument is, that tightening of the capital controls should depreciate the value of 
offshore ISK and loosening should appreciate the value of the offshore ISK. This would 
then in affect counter the expected effect of changes in the capital controls on asset 
prices. 
Whether changes are anticipated or not also affects the expectation of the significance 
of the changes. If changes are anticipated, it is more likely that the market has already 
responded, and possibly the response falls out of the event windows. If the changes are 
unanticipated, there is greater probability that the changes are unknown to investors, 
and therefore more likely that the premium will respond in a significant manner to the 
changes. 
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Interest from the media and financial analysts can be seen as a proxy for how much 
the changes affect the economy and market. Great interest indicates a larger impact and 
a greater chance of significant changes, little interest indicates a smaller impact and 
perhaps a lower chance of significant changes, and no interest indicates a very little 
impact of the events indicant a very low probability of any significant changes in the 
market. 
If the legislation and implementation fall on the same day, it increases the probability 
of immediate response from the market, and some significant changes, while a long 
interval between the two may increase the chance of longer adjustment period and lower 
chance of significant changes. It has been common, that the CBI and parliament introduce 
and agree on changes after the markets close, so the market can only respond a day after 
the change is made. 
3.6 Model validity 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used to test for a unit root in the series, and as is 
the case with many financial series there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. Therefore the data is converted by taking the logarithm of the 
prices and then obtaining the first difference. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑃𝑡) − ln⁡(𝑃𝑡−1) 
Running the ADF again on the logarithm difference, there is sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
The premium is calculated as the difference in price between Iceland and Denmark in 
proportion to the price in Iceland, with the following formula: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑡 =⁡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝐼𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝐼𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
 
The premium is a function of non-stationary processes and therefore the first 
difference is obtained and used in the study. 
Two ways to estimate whether the market model is an improvement over the constant 
return model are to look at the market return coefficient and if there is a significant 
increase in the R-squared of the model. If the market return coefficient has significant 
explanatory power on the stock return and the R-squared increases, which supports the 
market model. As expected, the market return coefficients are significant at the 99% 
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significance level and there is a significant increase in the R-squared, both regular and 
adjusted, for all series. The market model is therefore used. 
Examining the returns of Össur in Denmark and Iceland, with both exchange rates, the 
volatility is heteroscedastic and auto correlated. There are periods of high volatility and 
other times periods of low volatility. All series are tested for ARCH/GARCH effect and for 
every series we can reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH/GARCH effect. 
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4  Empirical results 
This chapter presents the main findings of the event study, where the results are divided 
into three parts. The first part focuses solely on Össur, the second on its foreign peers 
and in the end, on other Icelandic firms. All numerical results are reported in the 
appendix. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
When examining the price premium using the CBI rate and the offshore rate, between 
the Icelandic and Danish stock, an interesting fact is observed. On average, the stock price 
is higher on the Icelandic market than on the Danish marker using the CBI rate, but the 
contrary holds for the offshore rate. This can be seen in figures 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
Figure 5: Historical stock price in ISK using CBI rate. 
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Figure 6: Historical stock price in EUR, using offshore EUR/ISK rate for Icelandic stock price. 
The two premiums display very different consistency, but the offshore rate deviation 
is consistent through the sample, with the Icelandic stock cheaper compared to the 
Danish stock. The premium using the CBI rate is more volatile, and even though the price 
has been historically higher in Iceland for long periods, the difference has been eroded 
for the last two years and has been very inconsistent. Therefore, the premium 
increasingly resembles normal cross -listing with price discovery on two different markets 
(Eun and Sabherwal, 2003).  
A possible explanation for the change, is that shortly before, Össur was removed from 
the OMXI8 index (I. Úrvalsvísitala), made out of the eight most actively traded shares on 
the Nasdaq OMX Iceland. On 11th of June 2013 NASDAQ Iceland made the announcement 
that Össur hf. would be removed from the OMXI8 index at the end of the month and 
another company would be added instead (Gengi þeirra sem hverfa, 2013). 
There are no changes in any fundamentals of the company, but it seems to have had 
an impact on the Icelandic stock but not the Danish. After the change, using the CBI rate, 
the Icelandic premium vanished, and there has not been a steady premium for either of 
the two stocks since. The importance of being registered in the OMXI8 is somewhat 
substantial in Iceland because of the policy of big institutional investors, primarily pension 
funds, to hold stock in accordance to their weight in the OMXI8. This, at the time of capital 
controls, becomes even more important, as they will be forced to hold a higher 
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proportion of their holdings in Icelandic stocks, then they prefer (KPMG, 2014). However, 
to fully account for these effects, a special study would have to be conducted. 
 
Figure 7: Össur (DK) - Össur (ICE), CBI rate, black lines represent changes in capital controls. 
 
Figure 8: Össur (DK) - Össur (ICE), offshore rate, black lines represent changes in capital controls 
4.2 Össur hf. 
The starting point of the study, is to look at what effects the changes have had on the 
premium between the two stocks, calculated using the CBI rate and the offshore rate. 
The changes in capital controls have a significant effect on the premium using the CBI 
rate, five out of fourteen times, and the premium using the offshore rate is significant 
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of the seven cumulative abnormal returns are significant in the event windows. The fact 
that only one of the seven events has a significant effect on the premium, indicates that 
there might be other factors affecting the results, and that the robustness is not high. 
As expected, both neutral changes do not have a significant effect on the premium, 
using both exchange rates1. Both changes had no effect on the actual implementation of 
the capital controls and therefore did not have any effect on the premiums. Furthermore, 
both changes were anticipated and no interest was shown by the media or investors 
which is most likely due to the insignificance of the changes. Lastly, the laws were 
introduced couple of weeks before implementation, where the expectation was that all 
these variables would reduce the likelihood of significant results. 
There are five events that have two or more significant abnormal changes during the 
event window using the CBI rate2. There are some similarities with these events. Four of 
them are tightening of the capital controls and one is loosening of the controls. Four of 
the events are unanticipated, the legislation is introduced and implemented after the 
markets close on the given day and there is great interest in these events, both in media 
and by market participants. The fifth event, however, is an event that was anticipated 
and minimal interest was shown by the media, and the change was accepted about two 
weeks before the changes actually became law. For four of the events, the most 
significant change appeared on the event day itself, with other event windows showing 
lower absolute change in the abnormal behaviour. This is a possible indication that 
markets may overreact when they are faced with legal uncertainty and then adjusting 
their views in the coming days, to the new environment. 
All events that are either anticipated or shown little interest by the media and analysts 
do not cause significant changes in the premium, except the one on 16th of May 2014. 
That is somewhat in line with expectations, events that are anticipated give the markets 
more time to react and smooths their reaction, or possibly moving the event out of the 
observed event window in this study. Furthermore, little interest from the media 
indicates little interest from market participants and the general public.  
                                                     
1 11/6/2011 and 28/2/2012 
2 31/10/2009, 1/11/2010, 16/5/2014, 17/6/2014 and 6/3/2015 
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For four of the five events the premium is negative, indicating that the Icelandic stock 
is increasing more than the Danish stock, and one is positive indicating that the Danish 
stock is increasing more than the Icelandic stock. 
For one additional change in the capital controls that is unanticipated, interest from 
the media is high and the legislation is accepted and implemented in a single day, after 
the market close3. Why the premium does not respond significantly to this change can 
perhaps be explained by the nature of the change. That is, the change was primarily 
directed at individuals, who had been circumventing the capital controls in order to 
obtain foreign currency. To prevent this, the controls were tightened, without a 
significant change in the premium. Potential reasons may be that the leakage was not 
substantial or perhaps the previously leaking capital was not used to fund investments in 
the stock market. 
The first change was made less than two months after Össur was listed in Denmark 
(31/10/2009). The purpose was to tighten the current controls by preventing leakage of 
currency from the country which was a prominent problem. Concurrent to this change, 
newly invested foreign capital was now allowed to leave at their own convenience. 
Nevertheless, some uncertainty still remained, e.g. what exchange rate the investors 
would receive on exit (Icelandic Chamber of Commerce, 2011). The premium responded 
significantly, and as expected, the Icelandic stock rose more than the Danish one. The 
significance of the premium is most likely due to stricter rules on capital outflows, 
resulting in fewer options for domestic investors. The opening of foreign direct 
investment is unlikely to have had a significant effect, but foreign direct investment did 
not rise substantially during that period, and in fact, is still very low compared to the 
period before the crisis, see figure 9. 
                                                     
3 13/3/2012 
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Figure 9: Direct foreign investment 
The next significant change occurred when the CBI allowed owners of the Icelandic 
Össur stock, prior to the 1st of November 2011, date of the legislation, to transfer it over 
to the Copenhagen exchange. The premium with the CBI rate, has a negative sign were 
the Icelandic price is rising proportionally more than the Danish. The reason for this might 
be that the owners of Össur stocks in Iceland valued their stock higher since it gave them 
an option on foreign currency, being able to move it over to the Danish market at their 
convenience. Furthermore, this was the second time such a transfer was allowed, 
previously, this held for Össur stock owned prior to the 1st of November 2010, were 
allowed to move them over to the Danish market. If the market believed that this would 
be repeated for a third time, it might be valuable to hold the stock hoping for this future 
option. Whatever the reason, this law has not been changed again since the 1st of 
November 2011.  
The law change on the 16th of May 2014 is not in line with expectations. That is even 
though the change was anticipated, the interest in the media was small, and it was not 
legislated until three weeks after it had been agreed upon in parliament it still had a 
significant effect. Furthermore, the change did not represent a major shift in the capital 
controls, it was a change made to facilitate fining and prosecuting individuals 
circumventing the capital controls. That is, after the law was instated, there was no need 
to proof intent of breaking the law, only proof of breaking the law, with or without intent 
the individual, or firm could be prosecuted. Why this event has a significant effect is hard 
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to point out, possibly it caused stir and increased uncertainty on the market, and 
investors were expecting more changes in the future, since this was the first change in 
more than a year. 
The next significant change came about a month later, 17th June 2014. In this instance 
only two event windows had significant changes in the premium4. The expectations was 
that the Icelandic stock market should increase more than the Danish, since this increases 
demand for Icelandic assets, as these pension funds need to invest more in Iceland. 
However, the opposite happened, where the change in premium was significant. The 
pension funds were given some grace period to implement the necessary change in their 
investment policy, and it is possible that the market was simply responding to the 
increased uncertainty and the effects of the pension funds need to invest more in the 
future. Moreover, it is important to note, that the pension funds that had previously been 
circumventing the controls represented a very small portion of the Icelandic pension 
funds and thus when this behaviour was prevented it may not have influenced asset 
demand on the market. 
The last significant event also had only two significant event windows5, the change was 
that foreign holders of ISK, leftover holding since before the crisis, were limited even 
further in their investment options in Iceland to only one government bond. The premium 
was negative when it was significant, the Icelandic stock rising more than the Danish 
stock. This change may have caused capital to move from the bond market to the stock 
market resulting in a significant change in the premium. 
Using the offshore rate, there are fewer robust results. There are three events that 
report a significant change in only one event window6. Again, the assumption is, rather 
than these changes having a significant effect, some other factor may be causing the 
effect, and therefore it shows up only once. However, two changes, unexpectedly, have 
a significant effect on the offshore premium7. Again, the change on the 16th of May 2014 
                                                     
4 -1/+4 days and Even. 
5 -1/+4 days and -/+4 days. 
6 30/04/2011, 11/06/2011 and 17/09/2011 
7 9/3/2013 and 16/5/2014 
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is significant and greater than when using the CBI rate, which was not expected. There 
are couple of possible reasons for why the premium is significant both with the CBI rate 
and the offshore rate. The first is that the implication is more than what was indicated by 
interest in the media. Another, is that during that period there was an underlying factor 
causing the premium between the stocks to be significant. Furthermore, a movement in 
both exchange rates during this period might explain the significant change in the 
premium. However, this theory is not tested specifically. 
The other event that causes significant response is the tightening of the controls on 
the 9th of March 2013. This event, did not receive much interest from the media, even 
though it was unanticipated. The change was mainly implemented by CBI as it was given 
greater freedom than before to grant exception from the capital controls. There was no 
indication, however, how and when the CBI would grant those exception. The change 
caused the offshore premium between the two stocks to increase, which is also contrary 
to expectation. That is, since the change served to loosen the controls, it should have 
closed the gap rather than the contrary, so perhaps there are other things that might 
explain this. 
4.3 Foreign counterparts of Össur 
The firms Hanger, Inc., Tenet Healthcare and Universal Health Care are examined in 
comparison to Össur. Since these are all event dates that depend on changes in capital 
controls in Iceland the expectation is that they do not display any abnormal returns on 
any of the event days. If there are significant abnormal returns for a firm or even every 
firm on a specific date, it might suggest that other factors are at work that affect the price 
of stocks in the healthcare sector in general, other than the capital controls. 
The results are an in line with expectations, there are in general no significant 
abnormal returns for these firms which indicates that the event dates do not coincide 
with other events that affect all firms in the healthcare and prosthetic industry, so the 
effects on these dates are most likely bounded to Össur specifically.  
4.4 Icelandic firms 
The results for the remaining ten Icelandic firms, eligible for testing, are listed in the 
appendix. The overall result indicate that some changes in the capital controls do affect 
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companies on the Icelandic market, but varying somewhat depending on the company. 
Of the ten firms, seven firms display abnormal returns during changes in the capital 
controls for at least once. Marel, has majority of their income from abroad, displays four 
times significant abnormal returns during the changes. IG, also a large part of income in 
foreign markets, responds three times and other firms once or twice. But IG and Marel, 
have been listed for the longest of the firms examined. The event that causes the most 
firms to respond, five, is the last event, 6th of March 2015, which was both unanticipated 
and showed a high interest by the media. 
However, most changes in the capital controls do not seem to have a significant effect 
on the stock price. That is perhaps caused by the fact the empirical data is biased to show 
insignificant results or that the tweaks in capital controls are not large enough to effect 
the stock prices. Furthermore, with regards to expectation, it is noteworthy that the firms 
with exposure on foreign markets, rather respond according to expectation, than 
domestic firms. This may be an indication that investors, when they are in doubt or 
believe that the capital controls are being tightened, look to a greater extent for firms 
with exposure on foreign soil. Thereby, it decreases the price of domestically dependent 
firms and increases the price of firms with exposure to foreign currency. 
The fact that firms respond to different changes and differently to the changes, 
indicates that firms are affected differently. Investors might realize how each company is 
affected, and adjust their position accordingly, which explains why some firms show 
abnormal returns while other do not.  
The results seem to indicate what has been previously discussed, that firms in Iceland 
are affected by the capital controls, and more so, that changes in the capital controls can 
have a significant effect on their returns in the short run. 
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5  Conclusion 
Drawing the results together there are inconsistencies present with regards to Össur. 
Firstly, using the CBI rate premium between the two stocks, there was a significant 
premium on the Icelandic stock from October in 2010 to June 2013, but before and after 
that, the premium is not as consistent and might be explained by simply lagged response 
between the two markets. The results from the event study indicate that the premium 
responds significantly to five out of fourteen events, four of the five significant events are 
unanticipated, shown high interest in the media and legislated and implemented after 
the markets close. All these factors, are expected to increase the chance of detecting 
significant changes. However, one of the observed significant event is unexpected, shown 
little interest in the media and was anticipated. A possible explanation for the 
significance, is the nature of the change and its timing. 
The premium using the offshore rate of the ISK has been consistent since Össur was 
listed on the Danish stock exchange. The Danish stock has been valued higher, possibly 
indicating a market premium of the uncertainty of Iceland and the premium individuals 
are willing to pay for a stock on an unrestricted market over the Icelandic restricted 
market. Looking at the events, the premium only responds significantly twice of total 
fourteen events. The expectations was that the premium would respond less using the 
offshore rate, as the effects of changes in capital controls on the stock price would be 
reduced by countering effects of the offshore rate. This holds, to some extent, with fewer 
events being significant using the offshore rate.  
The foreign peers, in general, do not respond to changes in the capital controls, which 
was as expected, since the capital controls are only directed at Iceland and thus should 
not have any effect outside of it. Other Icelandic firms, however, respond significantly to 
some of the events. Seven out of the ten firms respond to at least one change in the 
capital controls. At most, there are five firms that respond to an event, the 6th of March 
2015. The firms that respond to most events are Marel and IG, both firms with a large 
part of their income in foreign currency. Possibly suggesting, that firms with foreign 
exposure are affected the most by the capital controls, both for better and worse. These 
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firms, however, are one of the few ways for investors to diversify from Icelandic risk 
factors. The fact that many of the Icelandic firms are indeed affected strengthens the 
belief that the changes in capital controls have effects, and may cause the Icelandic stocks 
of Össur to diverge from the Danish stocks of Össur. 
There are a number of things that can cause biases in the results, for Össur specifically, 
but also other Icelandic firms. First, the Icelandic market has always been very illiquid, 
both before and after the implementation of the capital controls. Changes in the capital 
controls therefore have to be larger than if the market had been liquid before, to affect 
the stock prices and premium of Össur’s stocks. Furthermore, the market is very 
dependent on investment from pension funds, and they have not been circumventing the 
capital controls from the start of the legislation. In addition, there is also the problem of 
endogeneity on the Icelandic market, but the small market and the small index of the 
largest firms, that is a proxy for the market returns, can be heavily influenced by any 
single company, which is then used to estimate the effects on the firm. This creates a loop 
where the return of a single firm affects the market return which then is used to explain 
the returns of the firm. Finally, if the events are state variables, they will affect all of the 
firms forming the index during the event window, hiding the effect of the firms using the 
market model. 
To answer the research question, the results seem to indicate that the changes in the 
capital controls have made a significant effect on the price premium of Össur stocks, and 
a part of the Icelandic market as well. The premium between the two stocks has been 
affected five times, two times using the offshore rate, indicating that investors are 
concerned about the changes and the uncertainty of the effects of the changes. It is hard 
to draw concrete conclusion about future effects of changes in the capital controls on the 
stock price and premium, but it seems that the implementation of the changes matter a 
great deal, where unanticipated changes have the greatest effect. 
What will happen if the capital controls will be removed dependence largely on how 
that operation will be executed, and is a subject of much debate in Iceland. The effects of 
abolishing the controls on stock prices are also largely unknown, but the embedded need 
of pension funds and investors for diversification abroad will undoubtedly affect the 
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demand for Icelandic stocks. If foreign investment will increase more in the future it may 
decrease the effect of opening the capital controls. 
In any case, the advantage of Össur over other Icelandic stock is very valuable. During 
changes in the capital controls the premium has responded significantly in some shape 
or form, but overall the stocks have followed each other closely. In effect, if the capital 
controls will be abolished, Össur, unlike other stocks on the market, should be anchored 
to some extent to the Danish market which should give a better view of the worth of the 
company than the Icelandic price. As the CBI premium has been eroded since 2013, there 
does not seem to be much difference in the two prices. The offshore rate, however, 
displays a significant and consistent premium between the two stocks, with the price of 
the unrestricted stock being higher than the price on the restricted stock. Using the 
traditional investment theory, this gap should be reduced or even eliminated if the capital 
controls are abolished. The other stocks do not have a similar anchor, making them more 
vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation even though some of them have a portion of 
their income in foreign currency. 
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Appendix I 
Chronology 
Since the implementation of the capital controls they have been changed numerous 
times. The changes vary somewhat, but can be divided to three categories: neutral, 
tightening and loosening. Where tightening makes it harder for people to transfer their 
capital and loosening makes it easier. The timeline of the capital controls can be seen in 
the graph below. 
The impact of the changes are examined in the empirical part. A distinction between 
expected and unexpected changes is also made or not. The main media outlets and news 
surrounding the changes are looked at to determine the makeup of the expectation. Only 
changes after Össur was listed in Copenhagen, 4/9/2009, are examined below. When 
there is a time gap between the laws being accepted and implemented, it is explicitly 
stated. 
31/10/2009 
The next change was made on the 31st of October. The overall effect on the capital 
controls, were tightening. There was a significant change in capital outflows, with further 
restrictions on capital outflows to prevent circumvention of the controls and creating 
consistency. However, restriction on inflows of capital was greatly reduced, allowing 
foreign entities to enter the market again and leaving with the invested funds at their 
convenience. The change was made by the Central Bank of Iceland. This came as a 
surprise, with the first news of this only arriving a day earlier when the Central Bank made 
a statement that some change was imminent, no indication on the arrangement of the 
change. The event happens about two months after Össur was listed in Denmark, with 
the event window bounded by that event (CBI, 2009). 
All the main media outlets reported the event, and there was also response from 
financial analysts. That indicates a high interest from market participants and the general 
public (e.g. Afnám gjaldeyrishafta hafið, 2009; Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 2011) 
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30/4/2010 
The change was twofold, the first was aimed at individuals and the maximum amount of 
currency allowed to take out was reduced from 500.000 ISK to 350.000 ISK per trip to a 
foreign country. The other one was mainly directed at offshore transactions with the ISK. 
The main purpose of the change, was to remove all doubt of the legal status of these 
transaction, but an exemption was taken out to assure traders that these kind of 
transactions were illegal (CBI, 2010a). 
There was some interest from the media, it mainly had to do with the fact that the 
maximum amount was reduced, but there was not a substantial response to the other 
change. 
14/6/2010, implemented 30/6/2010 
Again the 14th of June 2010 the controls were made stricter, but there wasn’t much 
interest from the media with little to none reporting. The essence of the controls was not 
changing, the CBI was given a more extensive role in issuing out penalties for breaking 
the currency law possibly explaining the limited interest from the media (Lög um 
breytingu á lögum um gjaldeyrismál og tollalögum, með síðari breytingum nr 78/2010). 
1/11/2010 
On 1st November of 2010, the CBI issued a statement that stated that owners stocks of 
Össur stocks on the Icelandic stock exchange, were allowed to move it to the Danish stock 
market. The owners of the stock were subsequently able to sell it in Danish krona if they 
wanted (CBI, 2010b). No such exceptions were made for the other four companies that 
were cross listed. The event came as a surprise to the market which was essentially the 
point, but if investors would have known of this change, investors would have been 
tempted to buy Össur stock, only to then switch them over to the foreign index change 
and cash in for foreign currency (Gjaldeyrishöftum aflétt gagnvart Össur hf., 2010; Össur 
hf. afléttir gjaldeyrishöftunum; 2010)  
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25/3/2011 
This event marks, as the CBI put it, the beginning of unwinding the capital controls. The 
announced some future actions that would be taken to try to reduce the large offshore 
ISK, owned by foreign investors. The plan was to hold currency auction, were the CBI 
would decide the currency rate at each time and then individual could make offers, to 
reduce the pressure and amount of offshore impatient capital, which would most likely 
try to get out as soon as the capital controls were abandoned. This announcement, did 
not really come as a surprise, but it had been anticipated for some time that the CBI would 
introduce some action to reduce the offshore ISK (CBI, 2011). 
Both, media and financial analyst showed this event much interest as it this was one 
of the first direct attempts to abolish the capital controls (Landsbankinn, 2011)  
11/6/2011, implemented 29/6/2011 
The capital controls were temporarily extended, but it didn’t come as surprise to anyone. 
The government had previously stated that the capital controls would not be abandoned 
before firstly in 2015, and this extension was primarily a legal action which would then 
later be made permanent (Lög um breytingu á lögum um gjaldeyrismál og tollalögum, 
með síðari breytingum nr. 81/2011) 
30/9/2011, implemented 30/9/2011 
The capital controls were again lengthened on the 30th September of 2011, but shorter 
than previously expected, 2013 instead 2015 (Lög um breytingu á lögum um 
gjaldeyrismál, tollalögum og lögum um Seðlabanka Íslands nr. 127/2011). The length of 
the capital controls at that time had become quite arbitrary and little respect was made 
to what year the government decided on, since no real believable plan was in place to 
abolish the controls. This had been anticipated, included in the bill were also new rules 
that were also to some extent anticipated. Some interest was shown from the media, but 
not much from financial analysts (Gjaldeyrishöft til 2013, 2011). 
28/2/2012, implemented 16/3/2012 
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On 28th of February of 2012 some formal changes were made to the capital controls. The 
only difference was an insignificant change in wording of the bill. There was no interest 
from the media or analysts (Lög um breytingar á ýmsum lögum vegna nýrra laga um 
Stjórnarráð Íslands, nr. 115/2011 nr. 21/2012). 
13/3/2012 
The next change came on the 13th March of 2012, where again the controls were 
tightened. The bill was introduced when the market closed 12th of March and passed as 
law before the market opened again (Lög um breytingu á lögum um gjaldeyrismál, nr. 
87/1992, með síðari breytingum nr. 17/2012). Before the bill was introduced, no news 
had been reported. The change made stricter rules on payments of foreign bonds, and 
limited exception for firms and individuals to move capital. There were some indication, 
that firms were using gaps in the laws to issue bonds on foreign soil and then repaying 
them back. The first news of this event came, just after the bill was introduced. Financial 
analysts showed interest in this events, and there were some indication that this change 
caused a stir on the bond market (Samþykkt með breytingu, 2012). 
9/3/2013 
The next change came approximately one year later. At last, the capital controls were 
made formally indefinite by the law so the need of extending the laws at few year interval 
was unnecessary. At the same time the CBI was given more power to give exceptions to 
individuals and firms to transfer capital (Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 87/1992, um 
gjaldeyrismál, með síðari breytingum (sólarlagsákvæði og heimild til reglusetningar) nr. 
16/2013). The overall effect is loosening on the capital controls, given the extended 
power of CBI to allow for exception. The indefinite nature of the capital controls wasn’t a 
major issue, it was widely believed that they would be extended at their given expiry date. 
The bill wasn’t expected, and the law passed about an hour after it was first introduced 
in the senate when the market had closed (Gjaldeyrishöft verða ótímabundinn, 2013). 
26/03/2013, implemented 5/4/2013 
On the 26th of March 2013 the government passed laws that increased the amount 
individuals to transfer money out of the country without a specific reason. This didn’t 
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seem to interest the major media and little to none reports are about this event. This also 
came with the caveat that the CBI was empowered with more ways to pose penalties and 
for higher amounts (Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 87/1992, um gjaldeyrismál, með síðari 
breytingum (rýmkun heimilda, aukið eftirlit, hækkun sekta o.fl.) nr. 35/2013). 
16/5/2014, implemented 6/6/2014 
The last change by the government than came the 16th of May 2014. The change mostly 
had to do with stricter rules on pay-outs of dividends and increased authority for the CBI 
to penalize for offenses. Overall strengthening (Lög um breytingu á lögum um 
gjaldeyrismál, nr. 87/1992, með síðari breytingum (arður, viðurlagaákvæði) nr. 67/2014). 
17/6/2014 
The next change was made on the 17th of June 2014 by the CBI, foreign pension funds 
operating in Iceland where given a four month grace period to adapt or the changed rules. 
But up until that point some pension funds had been investing for their clients in foreign 
countries. They did so as they believed that was within the laws, and the Central Bank 
seemed to agree with them, as they were not punished for their action up until that point. 
The pensions that were transferring savings abroad were subsidiaries for larger foreign 
companies for example Bayern-Versicherung. In the name of equality the CBI and stability 
it was not deemed right that these clients could transfer their savings abroad while others 
in Icelandic pensions were not able to do so (CBI, 2014).  
These changes caused large interest from both media and analysts, specifically from 
individuals connected to these firms (e.g. Nýjar reglur um gjaldeyrishöft vekja furðu, 
2014; Kemur Allianz í opna skjöldu, 2014).  
6/3/2015 
This change was directed specifically at offshore owners of ISK. Since the introduction of 
the capital controls, their capital has been stuck in Iceland with very few investment 
options. This change reduced their investment options even further, down to only one 
government bond and treasury bills (CBI, 2015). This raised the attention of most media 
outlets (Haftaundanþágum Seðlabankans breytt, þrengt að erlendum krónueigendum, 
2015) and also some financial analysts (Vikubyrjun, 2015).  
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Appendix II 
Descriptive statistics 
 Össur hf. 
  
Icelandic 
stock  
Danish 
stock  
Icelandic 
stock  
Danish 
stock 
Danish 
stock  
Premium  Premium 
Currency ISK DKK 
Offsh. 
EUR 
EUR ISK CBI rate 
Offsh. 
EUR 
Mean 0.08% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.08% -4.86% 27.00% 
Median 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -3.20% 26.59% 
Maximum 7.71% 9.02% 12.04% 9.01% 8.89% 9.88% 48.28% 
Minimum -6.39% -9.24% -14.34% -9.23% -9.30% -25.87% 5.39% 
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.08 
Skewness 0.26 0.30 -0.06 0.30 0.25 -0.65 0.03 
Kurtosis 6.11 5.60 7.03 5.61 5.41 2.73 2.37 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Results 
Össur 
***, ** and * 99%, 95% and 90% significance respectively 
 
 
 
  
Premium – CBI rate 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight -0.70%*** -1.68*** -0.41%*** -0.90%*** -1.00%*** -1.01%*** -3.32%*** 
30/4/2010 Tight -0.46% -1.55% 0.04% -0.10% -0.70* -0.79% -2.45% 
14/6/2010 Tight 0.20% 0.65% 0.55%*** 0.89% 0.34% 0.45% 0.74% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.96%** -2.22% -0.62%** -1.17** -1.27* -1.47% -4.31%** 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.07% -0.71% -0.06% -0.36% -0.10% -0.39% -0.53% 
11/6/2011 Neutral -0.02% -0.08% 0.16% -0.20% -0.02% -0.16% -0.55% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.23% -0.24% -0.22% -0.41% -0.06% -0.10% -0.53% 
28/2/2012 Neutral 0.60% -0.33% -0.87% -0.80% -0.74% -0.84% 0.60% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.20% 0.13% 0.16% 0.14% 0.29% 0.02% 0.38% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.54% 0.65% 0.17% 0.75% 0.40% 0.45% 0.59% 
26/3/2013 Loose -0.27% -0.97% -0.35% -0.12% -0.74% -0.92% -2.13%* 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.56%*** -1.75%*** -0.30%*** -0.78%*** -0.77%*** -0.94%*** -1.87%* 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.30% 1.13% 0.32% 0.92%* 0.12% 0.34% 2.54%* 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.67%** -1.21% 0.32% -0.97%** -1.11% -0.92% -3.22% 
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Premium - offshore 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight -4.83% -0.84% -0.56% 0.87% -0.83% -0.02% -0.03% 
30/4/2010 Tight -0.70% -1.04% -0.64% -0.49% -1.14% -1.05%** -2.62% 
14/6/2010 Tight 0.31% 0.24% -1.27% -0.03% -0.50% -4.96% 0.40% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.41% 0.94% -3.40% 0.26% 0.09% 0.45% 2.17% 
25/3/2011 Loose 1.21% 0.96% 1.01% -0.47% 0.54% 2.42% 0.89% 
11/6/2011 Neutral -0.45% -0.47% -0.39% -0.39% 0.17% -0.24% -1.05%*** 
17/9/2011 Tight 0.79% -0.78% 0.46% -0.67% 0.17% 1.21% -0.20% 
28/2/2012 Neutral 0.88% -0.68% -0.15% -0.73% -0.19% -0.04% 0.88% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.41% 0.41% 1.48% 0.63% 0.30%*** 0.38% 5.40% 
9/3/2013 Loose 1.00%*** 1.40% 0.79%*** 1.31%** 0.97%* 1.68%*** 1.45% 
26/3/2013 Loose -1.07% -0.30% 0.86% -1.08% -0.77% -1.45% -2.28% 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.58%*** -2.02%*** -0.32%*** -0.76%** -1.00%*** -1.14%*** -2.97%** 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.14% -0.65% -0.59% -0.37% -0.07% -0.53% 1.58% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.76% -1.70% -0.38% -1.17% -0.81% -1.06% -3.91% 
 
  
Stock price – Iceland 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight 0.83%* 1.38%* 0.21% 1.12%** 0.56% 1.16%** 0.71% 
30/4/2010 Tight -0.30% -0.94% -0.18% -0.38% -0.50% -0.63% -0.37% 
14/6/2010 Tight -0.63%*** -0.88% -0.36% -0.96%*** -0.57% -0.87%*** -0.04% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.30% -0.02% -0.20% -0.13% -0.33% -0.16% -0.53% 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.12% -0.23% 0.22% -0.25% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01% 
11/6/2011 Neutral -0.01% -0.04% -0.04% -0.03% -0.03% 0.09% -0.21% 
17/9/2011 Tight -1.38%*** -1.27%*** -1.47% -1.35%*** -0.77%*** -0.77%*** 2.33%*** 
28/2/2012 Neutral 0.21% -0.40% -0.46% -0.29% -0.25% -0.43% 0.21% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.21% 0.43% 0.05% 0.29% 0.41% 0.41% 0.32% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.02% 0.24% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.13% 0.80% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.05% -0.14% 0.04% 0.08% -0.09% -0.14% 0.59% 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.17% 0.03% -0.08% -0.21% 0.21% 0.10% -0.82% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.33% -0.59% -0.12% 0.12% -0.05% -0.22% -1.11% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.47% 1.28% 0.16% 0.35% 0.53% 0.74% 2.67% 
 51 
 
Stock price - Denmark 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight 0.31% -0.20% -0.35% 1.33% -0.54% 1.55% -0.43% 
30/4/2010 Tight 0.22% -0.51% -0.34% 0.10% -0.11% -0.75% -0.38% 
14/6/2010 Tight -0.07% -0.20% -0.28% -0.16% -0.31% -0.13% 0.02% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.62% -1.49*% -0.35% -0.57% -1.12%** -0.95% -3.00%** 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.22% -0.89% 0.10% -0.48% -0.24% -0.48% -0.48% 
11/6/2011 Neutral 0.26% 0.35% 0.12% -0.32% 0.33% 0.42% 0.27% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.62%* -1.71%*** -0.02% -0.89%* -0.74% -0.14% -0.74% 
28/2/2012 Neutral 0.77% -0.15% -0.39% -0.49% -0.89% -0.32% 0.77% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.73%* 0.46% 0.13% 0.37%* 0.36% 0.26% 0.39% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.83%*** 0.97% 0.48%** 1.21%*** 0.89%*** 0.81% 1.54% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.21% -0.50% 0.20% 0.27% -0.27% -0.28% -3.34% 
16/5/2014 Tight -1.31** 0.07% -0.79%** -0.06% -1.46%*** -0.43% -0.17% 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.18% -0.78%** -0.57% -0.04% -0.71%** -0.77%** 1.58% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.06% 0.07% -0.19% -0.07% 0.16% 0.17% 0.57% 
Table 3: Results, Össur 
 
Icelandic firms 
 
IG 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight 7.6%*** 4.27% 3.36%*** 8.20%*** 12.12%*** 9.65% 11.66% 
30/4/2010 Tight 0.35% 0.30% 0.03% 0.28% 0.24% 0.28% 0.27% 
14/6/2010 Tight 0.88%*** 0.56% 0.77%*** 1.52%*** 0.38% 2.77%*** -0.03% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.79%*** -3.72%*** -2.41%*** -0.86%*** -3.52%*** 2.97%*** -4.15%*** 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.86% -0.37% -0.72% -0.47% -0.32% -0.37% -0.89% 
11/6/2011 Neutral -0.01% -0.04% -0.27% -0.03% -0.03% 0.09% -0.21% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.97% -0.88% -0.27% -0.04% -0.16% -0.16% -0.71% 
28/2/2012 Neutral  0.42% -0.61% -0.14% -0.72% -0.41% -0.90% 0.42% 
13/3/2012 Tight -0.10% -0.98% -0.18% -0.81% -0.53% -0.73% -0.08% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.74% 0.15% -0.49%** 0.56% 0.90% 0.89% 0.66% 
26/3/2013 Loose -0.65% -0.61% -0.47% -0.02% -0.10% 0.75% 0.91% 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.82% -0.43% -0.23% -0.43% -0.49% -0.95% -0.88% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.46% 0.17% 0.78% 0.41% 0.24% 0.37% 0.58% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.37% 0.50% 0.48% 0.60% 0.80% 0.82% 0.08% 
 
Sjóvá 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.29% 0.68% 0.99% 0.18% 0.84% 0.48% 0.14% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.41% -0.04% -0.11% -0.35% -0.10% -0.32% -0.05% 
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Hagar 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
28/2/2012 Neutral  0.51% -0.60% -0.13% -0.13% -0.41% -0.33% 0.51% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.69% 0.86% 0.06% 0.95% 0.04% 0.11% 0.62% 
9/3/2013 Loose -0.06% -0.02% -0.32% -0.31% -0.67% -1.00% -0.41% 
26/3/2013 Loose -0.85% -0.77% -0.40% -0.44% -0.20% -0.92% -0.85% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.54%** -0.40% -0.71% -0.95% -0.05% 0.68%*** 0.96% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.86% 0.28% 0.34% 0.54% 0.79% 0.57% 0.67% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.56% 1.20%*** 1.67%*** -0.59% 0.53% 0.74% 2.67% 
 
Eimskip 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.90% 0.13% 0.15% 0.25% 0.63% 0.06% 0.85% 
26/3/2013 Loose -0.22% 0.56%*** -0.03% -0.02% 0.56%* 0.98% 0.20% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.54%** -0.04% -0.14% -0.68% -0.42% -0.91% -0.58% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.42%*** 0.75% 0.99% 0.49%** 0.58% 0.55%** -0.58% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.51% 1.20%*** -0.15%* -0.52%*** -0.37%* -0.69% -0.31% 
 
 
N1 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.32% -0.09% -0.16% 0.02% 0.74% 0.83% -0.44% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.35% -0.30% 1.67%*** 0.21% 0.34% 0.27% 0.55% 
         
TM 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.42% -0.59% -0.12% 0.49% -0.05% 0.55% -1.11% 
6/3/2015 Tight -2.40%*** 1.20% -0.67%*** -3.02%*** -0.58% 0.74% 2.67% 
 
Reginn hf 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.07% 0.38% 0.66% 0.94% 0.83% 0.33% 0.01% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.74%** 0.40% 0.61% 0.92% 0.40% 0.27% 0.05% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.54%** -0.52% -0.24% -0.02% -0.28% -0.71% -0.82% 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.23% -0.98% -0.59% -0.51% -0.72% 0.55%** -0.32% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.08% -0.09% -0.42% -0.98% -0.43% 0.77% 0.09% 
 
VÍS 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.40%*** -0.87%** -0.21%** -0.45%** -0.55%** -0.64%** -1.11% 
6/3/2015 Tight -1.48%*** -1.30%*** -0.46%*** -1.62%*** -0.87%*** -0.91%*** -0.70% 
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Fjarskipti 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.57%*** 0.37% 0.54% 0.30% 0.39% 0.83% 0.79% 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.77%*** -1.01%*** -0.12% -0.60%* -0.86%*** -0.95%*** -0.24% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.87% 0.35% 0.43% 0.26% 0.42% 0.73% 0.82% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.82% -0.58% -0.84% -0.25% -0.34% -0.53% -0.77% 
 
Marel 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight 0.82% 1.38% 0.21% 1.12% 0.56% 1.16% 0.71% 
30/4/2010 Tight -0.002962 -0.94% -0.18% -0.38% 1.44%*** -0.63% -0.37% 
14/6/2010 Tight 1.51%*** 0.99% 0.82%*** 0.26% 0.90%*** 2.77%*** -0.04% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.49% -1.27%* -0.42%* -0.68% -0.86%** -0.55% -0.04% 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.12% -0.23% 0.22% -0.25% -0.03% -0.14% 0.01% 
11/6/2011 Neutral -0.01% -0.04% -0.27%* -0.03% -0.03% 0.09% -0.21% 
17/9/2011 Tight -1.38% -1.27% -0.15% -1.35% -0.77% -0.77% 2.33% 
28/2/2012 Neutral  0.57% -0.77% -0.82% -0.43% -0.09% -0.50% 0.57% 
13/3/2012 Tight -0.40%* -0.77%** -0.21% -0.41%* -0.52%** -0.34% 1.44% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.02% 0.24% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.13% 0.80% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.05% -0.14% 0.04% 0.08% -0.09% -0.14% 0.59% 
16/5/2014 Tight -0.17% 0.03% -0.08% -0.21% 0.21% 0.10% -0.82% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.33% -0.59% -0.12% 0.12% -0.05% -0.22% -1.11% 
6/3/2015 Tight -0.56% 1.28% -0.57%** -0.59%** 0.53% 0.74% 2.67% 
Table 4: Results, Icelandic firms 
Foreign peers 
Hanger, Inc. 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight -0.63% -0.12% -0.38% -0.97% 0.30% -1.50%* -1.66% 
30/4/2010 Tight 0.13% -0.01% -0.07% -0.15% 0.34% 0.45% -2.51% 
14/6/2010 Tight -1.00% -0.52% 0.38% -0.62% -1.08% -0.13% -0.34% 
1/11/2010 Loose -0.28% 0.60% 0.60% -0.19% 0.28% -0.22% -0.52% 
25/3/2011 Loose -0.07% 0.46% -0.52% -0.40% 0.44% -0.16% 3.02% 
11/6/2011 Neutral 1.25%** -0.18% 0.40% 1.02% 0.72% 0.62% -3.02% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.01% 0.10% 0.94% -0.02% 0.12% -0.26% -2.17% 
28/2/2012 Neutral  0.60% -0.56% -0.18% -0.16% -0.69% -0.01% 0.60% 
13/3/2012 Tight 0.46% 0.14% -0.20% 0.38% 0.31% 0.49% -0.65% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.37% 0.30% 0.07% 0.75% -0.29% -0.04% 0.23% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.51% 0.49% 0.21% 0.60% 0.26% 0.42% 1.12% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.45% 0.89% -0.44% 1.24% 0.38% 0.90% 2.36% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.03% 0.12% -0.51%*** 0.50% -0.15% 0.36% 0.15% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.01% -0.41% 0.47% -0.05% -0.02% 0.15% -1.29% 
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Tenet Healthcare 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight -0.96% -0.96% -0.59% -1.18% -0.83% -1.08% -0.51% 
30/4/2010 Tight 0.09% -0.23% 0.15% -0.12% 0.21% 0.05% 0.21% 
14/6/2010 Tight -1.10% 0.01% -0.68% -1.70% -0.79% 0.53% -3.65% 
1/11/2010 Loose 0.12% -0.08% -0.27% -0.21% -0.09% -0.17% -1.71% 
25/3/2011 Loose 0.19% 1.28% -0.18% 1.56% 0.08% 0.15% 1.70% 
11/6/2011 Neutral 0.23% 0.45% 0.06% 1.21%** 0.06% 0.55% 1.33% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.22% -1.52% -0.65% -0.37% -0.80% -0.17% -1.69% 
28/2/2012 Neutral  -0.13% -0.23% -0.39% -0.39% -0.07% -0.95% -0.13% 
13/3/2012 Tight -0.77% -1.99% -0.33% -1.06% -1.02% -1.19%* -3.90%** 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.74% 1.14% 0.37% 0.57% 0.92% 1.19%** -0.71% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.86% 1.55% 0.39% 0.80% 1.31% 1.03% 1.06% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.96% -0.50% 0.26% 0.81% 0.87% 0.28% -1.14% 
17/6/2014 Tight -0.02% 0.25% 0.03% 0.53% -0.61% -0.24% -0.65% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.37% -1.43% 0.46% -0.32% 0.73% 0.16% 2.28% 
 
Universal Health Care 
Date Effect +/- 4 +/- 1 +/- 10 -1/+4 -4/ +1 +/- 2 Even 
31/10/2009 Tight -1.35% -2.68*** -0.80%** -1.98%*** -1.56%** -1.49%* 2.00% 
30/4/2010 Tight 0.37% 0.89% 0.51% -0.12% 0.81% 0.09% -1.99% 
14/6/2010 Tight -0.47% 0.63% -0.22% -0.36% 0.08% 0.31% 0.47% 
1/11/2010 Loose 0.50% 0.26% 0.16% 0.13% 0.83%* 0.98% -0.81% 
25/3/2011 Loose 0.32% 0.20% -0.11% 0.84% -0.44% 0.24% 0.39% 
11/6/2011 Neutral 0.33% 0.26% -0.16% 0.20% 0.43% 0.71% -0.38% 
17/9/2011 Tight -0.18% -0.47% -0.49% 0.39% -0.77% -0.11% -1.76% 
28/2/2012 Neutral  -0.27% -0.67% -0.11% -0.94% -0.46% -0.29% -0.27% 
13/3/2012 Tight -0.13% -0.45% -0.09% -0.22% -0.20% -0.12% -1.93% 
9/3/2013 Loose 0.27% 0.47% 0.17%* 0.35% 0.20% 0.23% 0.14% 
26/3/2013 Loose 0.42% 0.80% 0.24% 0.50% 0.50% 0.59% 1.65% 
16/5/2014 Tight 0.76% -0.52% 0.26% 0.30% 0.43% 0.47% -0.47% 
17/6/2014 Tight 0.52% -0.02% -0.88% 0.57% 0.13% 0.46% 0.33% 
6/3/2015 Tight 0.05% -0.24% 0.52% -0.02% -0.13% 0.63% -0.47% 
 
